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I. INTRODUCTION
"It's disgusting what he did, it's disgusting. . . his 'Dream
Team'-'Scheme Team' maybe is more accurate."'
1. David Margolick, Simpson Tells Why He Declined To Testify as Two Sides Rest Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1995, at Al.
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Fred Goldman blamed the defense attorneys when a Los
Angeles jury found O.J. Simpson not guilty of murdering his son, Ron
Goldman, and Nicole Brown Simpson on October 3, 1995. Yet
Goldman was not the only one who blamed the defense attorneys for
the acquittal; much of the media agreed that Simpson was guilty and
had escaped his rightful punishment. As one New York Times reporter
lamented, "To watch Mr. Simpson slip away from justice ... was an
infuriating sight."2 People who believed in Simpson's guilt cited
Johnnie Cochran's decision to "play the race card"3 and his clever
catch phrases like "if it doesn't fit, you must acquit."4 Others blamed
the prosecuting attorneys. On the day after the verdict, author Scott
Turow described the prosecutors as "doomed from the start" for their
use of "ugly tactics that . .. aroused suspicions about the criminal
justice system among members of racial minorities in Los Angeles and
elsewhere."5
Yet O.J. Simpson is not the only defendant who-according to
popular opinion-has slipped away from justice because of his
attorneys' skill. A jury acquitted the late Michael Jackson of his child
molestation charges in 2005.6 That same year, actor Robert Blake
escaped charges of murdering his wife, Bonny Lee Bakley.7 And just
two years earlier, a jury acquitted New York millionaire Robert Durst
of murdering his neighbor, Morris Black.8 All three men had very
expensive, well-known defense attorneys, and all three men faced
similar accusations of slipping away from justice in the press after
their acquittals. More recently, Mary Winkler, a preacher's wife from
Selmer, Tennessee who killed her husband and fled with her children
to the Alabama coast, endured the same scrutiny from the popular
2. Frank Rich, Journal: The L.A. Shock Treatment, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1995, at A21.
3. Seth Mydans, Not Guilty: The Lawyers: In the Joy of Victory, Defense Team is in
Discord, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1995, at All.
4. David Margolick, Simpson's Lawyer Tells Jury That Evidence 'Doesn't Fit,' N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 28, 1995, at Al.
5. Scott Turow, Simpson Prosecutors Pay for Their Blunders, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1995, at
A21.
6. See Paul Dale Roberts et al., Letters to the Editor, Prosecutors Fumble Another
Celebrity Case, USA TODAY, June 15, 2005, at A10 (criticizing the verdict and discussing the
prosecutors' mistakes in the Michael Jackson case).
7. See Greg Risling, Blake Not Guilty of Wife's Murder: Prosecution 'Couldn't Put the Gun
in his Hand,' Jury Foreman Says, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 17, 2005, at 3 (detailing the
shortcomings of the prosecution in the Robert Blake case).
8. See Gary Cartwright, The Verdict: The Safe Money Had Robert Durst Getting Convicted
of Murder in Seconds Flat. How on Earth Did He Get Off? Two Words: Dick DeGuerin, TEXAS
MONTHLY, Feb. 2004, at 54, 56 (discussing the role of Dick DeGuerin in Robert Durst's acquittal).
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press during her trial. Despite being accused of first-degree murder,
her "Dream Team" of defense attorneys made "murder no longer an
issue."9 Instead, the jury convicted Winkler of voluntary
manslaughter, and the judge sentenced her to only sixty-seven days in
prison. As one journalist sarcastically noted after the verdict, "Mary
Winkler's defense lawyers did just what they had to do to convince a
jury not to convict her of murder, even though she shot her sleeping
preacher husband in the back with a shotgun." 0 Even Winkler's own
defense attorney said after trial that "the verdict was most probably
just.""
Clearly, much of the media believes that an attorney can decide
a case. Get a good enough attorney, the story goes, and you can get off
on anything. Yet the belief in the power of a good attorney extends far
beyond popular opinion-and all the way to the Supreme Court. In
many opinions, Justices have expressed concern about the
consequences of weak representation.12
But just how important is a good attorney? Can a skillful
attorney actually change the verdict? More importantly, in criminal
trials, can a good defense attorney let guilty people go free, or can a
good prosecutor send innocent people to jail? Every day, as more high-
profile defendants find themselves in court, the anecdotal evidence of
this attorney skill effect continues to mount. Yet no one has decisively
answered these questions-not only for high-profile defendants, but
for the everyday defendant as well.
This Note will argue that a skillful defense attorney is not as
powerful as popular opinion would lead us to believe. Here, I define
skill as the qualities that an attorney brings to the courtroom
independent of his case's strength, such as rhetorical abilities, tactical
strategies, and knowledge of the law. Regardless of their skill,
9. Lawrence Buser, Dream Team Took Jury Into Nightmare, Emerged With Murder No
Longer an Issue, COMMERCIAL APPEAL, Apr. 21, 2007, at Al.
10. Id.
11. Wife Guilty of Manslaughter in Minister's Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2007, at A17
(emphasis added).
12. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 710 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(noting that the "difficulties of estimating prejudice after the fact are exacerbated by the
possibility that evidence of injury to the defendant may be missing from the record precisely
because of the incompetence of defense counsel"); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771
(1970) (holding that "if the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution is to serve its
purpose, defendants cannot be left to the mercies of incompetent counsel, and that judges should
strive to maintain proper standards of performance by attorneys who are representing
defendants in criminal cases in their courts"); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)
(discussing the consequences of inadequate access to counsel).
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criminal defense attorneys do not have a statistically significant effect
on the verdict or sentencing outcomes. Prosecuting attorneys, on the
other hand, can influence trial outcomes. A jury is more likely to
convict a defendant when the prosecutor has a high level of skill.
Although important for many reasons, prosecutorial skill is
particularly critical since the prosecution has the burden of proof in a
criminal trial. This outcome that emphasizes the impact of
prosecutorial skill-running so contrary to our everyday beliefs-
suggests that we have been focusing on the wrong side. Just like Fred
Goldman, we are quick to blame the defense attorneys when we think
a high-profile defendant has slipped away from justice. For more low-
profile defendants, we are overly preoccupied with the adequacy of,
and the disparities in, defense attorneys. Yet we should really be
concerned about the disparities in prosecutors.
To demonstrate the importance of prosecuting attorney skill,
Part II of this Note first considers previous literature from law and
other disciplines on the impact of attorney skill. Part III discusses the
data set used to conduct this study, and Part IV outlines the model of
the attorney skill effect. Part V gives the results of the data analysis
and demonstrates the effect of prosecuting attorney skill on trial
outcomes-and the lack of effect of defense attorney skill on trial
outcomes. Part VI argues that public attention should shift away from
defense attorneys and onto prosecutors. If we expect defendants to
receive a fair trial, we need to devote more resources to ensuring that
prosecutors are well qualified and adequately trained to eliminate the
disparities between them. Part VII concludes by relating these results
to the attorney skill effect so often discussed in the popular press.
II. PREVIOUS WORK ON THE IMPACT OF ATTORNEY SKILL
Scholars from many disciplines have questioned the impact of
attorney skill for years. This Part will chronologically explore the
evolution of their efforts in the fields of law, psychology, and
economics. For scholars in every field, two fundamental problems have
stood in the way of exploring the attorney skill effect. First, and most
obviously, measures of attorney skill are very difficult to quantify-
and even more difficult to obtain. Unlike quarterbacks, practicing
attorneys do not have ratings by which to evaluate their seasons of
trial work. Second, even though we can easily observe that trends in
trial outcomes differ between attorneys, it is almost impossible to
attribute these differences solely to the attorney's skill. Variables such
as location and practice area, as well as personal characteristics like
[Vol. 63:1:267270
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race and gender, could feasibly create systematic differences in
attorney trial outcomes. 13
Of all these other variables, perhaps the most significant is a
process commonly referred to as attorney matching, where attorneys
pair with clients based on the strength of their case. 14 Due to attorney
matching, an attorney may have a high trial success rate that has
nothing to do with his skill. For example, a famous defense attorney
may succeed in getting his clients acquitted more frequently. But this
attorney's high success rate may be simply due to the fact that the
attorney only takes cases that he is likely to win. Similarly, clients
may spend more money on high-priced attorneys when they are
innocent in order to ensure their acquittal and public vindication. On
the other side of the criminal justice system, more experienced
prosecutors may be assigned to weaker cases in order to increase the
probability that the accused criminal will be convicted and brought to
justice.15 Criminal trial outcomes and the attorneys working on each
side are easily observable, but without more information about each
case-such as the type of case, strength of the case, defendant
characteristics, and victim characteristics-researchers cannot
separate out the effects of each attorney's skill from the effects of
attorney matching.' 6
Despite these data problems, scholars have attempted to
untangle the attorney skill effect 7 because the question of attorney
skill goes to the very heart of our criminal justice system.'8 The Sixth
13, For example, a defense attorney may practice in a location with highly empathetic
juries, leading to systemically better results for this attorney than a similar attorney practicing
in a less defense-friendly jurisdiction. Similarly-whether fair or not-the race or gender of a
defense attorney could plausibly affect trial outcomes. Juries in areas of the country highly
sensitized to race may take greater note of the race of all attorneys involved.
14. See David S. Abrams & Albert H. Yoon, The Luck of the Draw: Using Random Case
Assignment to Investigate Attorney Ability, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1145, 1146-48 (discussing the
problem of attorney matching in evaluating the effect of attorney skill).
15. See id. at 1146 (explaining that "the nonrandom pairing of attorney and client in most
cases makes it difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between attorney ability and case
selection").
16. See id. at 1147 (noting that "case outcomes may reflect the matching process between
clients and attorneys as much as the ability of the attorneys who represent their clients").
17. Here, and throughout the paper, the "attorney skill effect" simply refers to the effect of
attorney skill on trial outcomes. Attorney skill is defined in Part I as the qualities that an
attorney brings to the courtroom independent of his case's strength, such as rhetorical abilities,
tactical strategies, and knowledge of the law.
18. E.g., Abrams & Yoon, supra note 14, at 1147-49 (investigating whether systematic
differences in defense attorney ability exist and their effects on trial outcome); Floyd Feeney &
Patrick G. Jackson, Public Defenders, Assigned Counsel, Retained Counsel: Does the Type of
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Amendment's guarantee of the right to counsel19 not only requires
courts to allow defendants adequate access to counsel 20 but also
commands them to provide indigent defendants with counsel.21 More
importantly, the Sixth Amendment requires that counsel do more
than just appear to represent a client. In United States v. Cronic, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that "if counsel entirely fails to subject the
prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has
been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary
process itself presumptively unreliable."22 Yet long before the Cronic
decision, the Supreme Court indicated that representation by a
competent attorney is necessary to the proper functioning of our
criminal justice system-where the accused are innocent until proven
guilty, the innocent are acquitted, and the guilty are brought to
justice.23 As Justice George Sutherland reasoned in his famous opinion
in Powell v. Alabama:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the
right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and
sometimes no skill in the science of law. . . . He requires the guiding hand of counsel at
every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces
the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If that
be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or
those of feeble intellect.
2 4
Implicit in Sutherland's discussion of the right to counsel was
his belief in the right to effective and skillful counsel. After all, an
incompetent attorney would not be much of a "guiding hand."25
According to Sutherland, an effective and skillful attorney could
actually change the trial outcome by removing the "danger of
conviction" of an innocent person. 26
Criminal Defense Counsel Matter?, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 361, 407-10 (1991) (exploring the
differences between different types of defense attorneys); Daniel Linz et al., Attorney
Communication and Impression Making in the Courtroom: Views From Off the Bench. 10 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 281, 281-301 (1986) (designing an experiment to test the effect of prosecution and
defense attorney skill on trial outcomes).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
20. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71-73 (1932).
21. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963).
22. 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984).
23. See, e.g., McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (arguing that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel includes a right to competent counsel); Powell, 287 U.S. at 68-69
(discussing the consequences of inadequate access to counsel).
24. Powell, 287 U.S. at 68-69.
25. Id. at 69.
26. Id.
[Vol. 63:1:267272
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Concerns about the attorney skill effect predated even Justice
Sutherland, however, and studies of attorney skill began as early as
1919.27 Many of the earliest studies did not use controls: the authors
simply compared trial outcomes between retained and appointed
defense attorneys and drew inferences about their relative skill
levels.28 Because these studies were rudimentary at best-unable to
control for any attorney-matching problems, strength of the
underlying case, and even sometimes the type of case-their results
often contradicted each other. In 1991, Floyd Feeney and Patrick G.
Jackson reviewed the twelve previous studies that had compared the
trial outcomes achieved by public defenders, court-appointed counsel,
and privately retained counsel. Many of the studies they reviewed
reached opposite results, and the authors concluded that "[t]he best
research to date indicates that type of defense counsel . .. is not an
important determinant of case outcomes."29 As a result, the authors
endorsed the explanation of Dallin Oaks and Warren Lehman's 1968
study, which concluded that criminal attorneys were too
heterogeneous to analyze as a group:
The ranks of private lawyers doing criminal work include the few top men in the city,
baffled family lawyers whose clients have fallen into the hands of the police, hacks who
find their clients in the halls of the Criminal Courts building, corporation lawyers whose
clients ask them to perform the work as a service and young men on the way up who
mix criminal and civil practice .... 30
In other words, the small sample size and the large variation in
personal characteristics drove the repeatedly inconclusive results
about the attorney skill effect. 31
Around the time of Feeney and Jackson's article, scholars from
outside the legal field began to explore the attorney skill effect. In
27. See REGINALD HERBER SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 123 (1919) (finding that retained
counsel had higher acquittal rates than public defenders, but public defenders had better
probation outcomes).
28. See, e.g., PETER W. GREENWOOD ET AL., PROSECUTION OF ADULT FELONY DEFENDANTS IN
Los ANGELES COUNTY: A POLICY PERSPECTIVE 52-56 (1973), available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R1127/ (finding that assigned counsel had better acquittal
rates, but public defenders had better sentencing outcomes); DALLIN H. OAKS & WARREN
LEHMAN, A CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE INDIGENT: A STUDY OF CHICAGO AND COOK
COUNTY 162-63 (1968) (finding that private counsel and publicly appointed counsel had similar
trial outcomes); LEE SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN STATE
COURTS 20-29 (1965) (finding retained counsel had better trial outcomes than appointed
counsel).
29. Feeney & Jackson, supra note 18, at 407.
30. Id. at 409 (quoting Dallin H. Oaks & Warren Lehman, Lawyers for the Poor, in THE
SCALES OF JUSTICE 91-93 (Abraham S. Blumberg ed., 1970)).
31. Id.
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1986, psychologists Daniel Linz, Steven Penrod, and Elaine McDonald
recognized the scarcity of good data to test the effect of attorney skill
on trial outcomes, 32 so they designed an experiment to create their
own data. 33 The authors solicited undergraduates to observe fifty
trials.34 After the trials ended, the undergraduates completed a survey
rating each attorney's courtroom behaviors, such as articulateness,
enthusiasm, and legal informativeness.3 5 The authors also contacted
both the jurors and the attorneys and asked them to fill out a similar
questionnaire rating each attorney's performance. 36  The
undergraduates systematically gave higher marks to the
prosecutors. 37 Moreover, prosecutors' self-assessments closely matched
the jurors' ratings, while defense attorneys vastly overrated their
courtroom skills.38 None of these skill ratings, however, had a
statistically significant effect on trial outcome. 39 Linz, Penrod, and
McDonald concluded that small sample size might be to blame for
their inconclusive results. 40
Due to lack of data, twentieth-century scholars had little luck
determining the effect of attorney skill on trial outcome. Indeed, this
data problem limited scholars' ability to answer the larger question:
what outside factors, other than guilt or innocence, affect the outcome
of a criminal trial? Within the last few years, however, some
economists have obtained new data that have at last allowed them to
examine the outside determinants of criminal trial outcome. For
example, Richard Boylan studied the salaries of U.S. Attorneys from
1969 to 1999, finding that higher-paid U.S. Attorneys had higher
conviction rates and generated longer prison sentences. 41 In a later
study, Boylan demonstrated that federal prosecutors who successfully
sought longer prison sentences were more likely to become a federal
judge or a partner in large law firm after leaving the U.S. Attorney's
32. Linz et al., supra note 18, at 281-302.
33. Id. at 284.
34. Id. at 286.
35. Id. at 286-87.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 296.
38. Id. at 297.
39. Id. at 299.
40. Id. at 300-01 (suggesting that future studies should gather ratings on attorney
performance from judges and juries).
41. Richard T. Boylan, Salaries, Turnover, and Performance in the Federal Criminal Justice
System, 47 J.L. & ECON. 75, 75-92 (2004).
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office.42 Boylan's results indicated that, in the courtroom, prosecutors
had incentives to maximize prison terms instead of convictions or
indictments. 43
On the other hand, Radha Iyengar studied the two types of
court-appointed attorneys for indigent defendants: public defenders,
who were paid a predetermined salary for all their cases, and private
attorneys appointed under the Criminal Justice Act,44 who were paid
on an hourly basis. 45 Iyengar found that defendants represented by
public defenders were less likely to be found guilty and received
shorter prison sentences than defendants represented by Criminal
Justice Act attorneys. Although she was not able to control for
attorney skill directly, she was able to control for factors such as the
attorneys' experience, average caseload, law school quality, and wages.
lyengar concluded that these outside factors at least partially
explained the differences in courtroom performance. 46
While Boylan and Iyengar successfully identified some of the
outside influences on attorney skill, no one successfully used empirical
methods to determine the direct effects of attorney skill until 2007. In
that year, Dan Abrams and Albert Yoon published the first empirical
study evaluating the effects of attorney skill that systematically
controlled for type of case, the race of the defense attorney, and most
importantly, attorney-matching effects. 47 Abrams and Yoon collected a
large data set of over 11,000 cases from the Clark County Public
Defenders' Office in Nevada. For each case, the data contained
information on the type of charge, whether the case went to trial, the
public defender assigned to the case, how many years of experience
the public defender had, the race of the public defender, and where the
public defender went to law school.48 The advantage of this data set
was that in the Clark County Public Defenders' Office, public
defenders were randomly assigned to cases.49 Thus, even though
Abrams and Yoon could not directly control for the strength of the case
42. Richard T. Boylan, What do Prosecutors Maximize? Evidence from the Careers of U.S.
Attorneys, 7 AM. LAW & ECON. REV. 379, 379-402 (2005).
43. Id. at 396.
44. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(3) (2006).
45. Radha lyengar, An Analysis of Attorney Performance in the Federal Indigent Defense
System 2-5 (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13187, 2007), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl3187.
46. Id. at 28-30.
47. Abrams & Yoon, supra note 14, at 1176-77.
48. Id. at 1161-64.
49. Id. at 1149.
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against the defendant, case strength did not create bias in their
analysis because attorneys were randomly assigned to defendants. As
a result, Abrams and Yoon were able to control for any attorney-
matching effects that might bias their analysis.50
Although Abrams and Yoon did not have a direct measure of
attorney skill, they did have data on each attorney's law school, race,
and years of experience in the public defenders' office, which they used
as proxies for each attorney's skill.5' Using regression analysis, the
authors found that experience was crucial: clients represented by
attorneys who had been in the public defenders' office for a long time
had better results. 52 On the other hand, the attorney's law school did
not seem to affect the defendant's outcome.53 Surprisingly, Abrams
and Yoon also found an effect of the attorney's race on the defendant's
outcome: Hispanic public defenders systematically achieved better
results for their clients. The authors suggested that their exceptional
performance might be due to the "potential language advantage" with
their clients. 54
Abrams and Yoon's paper was groundbreaking in assessing the
effect of attorney skill. It was the first paper that had a large sample,
sound empirical methods, and strong enough data to avoid the pitfalls
that befell previous empirical analyses in this area. Nonetheless, their
study still left several pressing questions unresolved. First, Abrams
and Yoon only assessed the effect of the defense attorney's skill. But
what effect did the prosecuting attorney's skill have on outcomes?
Abrams and Yoon could say nothing about the effect of the prosecuting
attorney's skill-and whether it was more important or less important
than the defense attorney's skill. Moreover, because Abrams and
Yoon's analysis only controlled for attorney-matching effects on the
defendant's side, their estimates of the effect of the defense attorney's
skill could still have been biased. Even though the public defenders
were randomly assigned to the case, prosecutors were not. Prosecutors
were likely assigned based on the strength of the case or even the
perceived skill of the defendant's attorney.
Second, Abrams and Yoon used only proxies for attorney skill
in their study. Whether an attorney's education or years of experience
50. Id.
51. See id. at 1167-70 (discussing the effect that these attorney characteristics had on the
duration and probability of incarceration).
52. Id. at 1173-75.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1175.
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have an influence on trial outcome is an interesting question, but it is
a different question than the effect of actual skill. When we speak of
attorney skill, we speak of an attorney's ability to research, to apply
the research to his client's case, to investigate the facts, to convey
these facts in court, to assess the strengths of his client's case, and
most importantly, to be persuasive enough that the trier of fact should
believe his version of the story.55 Although these skills often come with
time, experience is not perfectly correlated with skill. It is easy to
imagine a young attorney who is so persuasive and effective in court
that he gets better-than-average outcomes for his clients, despite his
modest experience. Conversely, it is easy to imagine a highly
experienced attorney who, despite the vast number of cases that he
has tried, is inarticulate and utterly unpersuasive in court. Thus,
although an attorney's years of experience and educational
background are interesting-and could plausibly be correlated with
actual skill-they are not perfect proxies for skill.
Third, Abrams and Yoon only looked at criminal trials where
the defendant was represented by a public defender, which suggests
that their estimate might also be subject to sample-selection bias.56
Because all of the defendants used public defenders, these defendants
were presumably poorer than the average defendant. If poor
defendants are accused of different crimes than more affluent
defendants, then Abrams and Yoon's data might oversample certain
types of crimes where attorney skill is particularly effective. Moreover,
Abrams and Yoon's data may oversample low-stakes cases. When a
poor defendant is accused of a crime, he can choose either to use a free
public defender or to attempt to raise money for a private attorney.
This poor defendant is much more likely to ask his family, friends,
church, and community for money to a hire a private attorney in a
high-stakes case. So for example, a defendant may just take a public
defender when, if convicted, he will only get probation, but he may
pool all his available resources to pay a private attorney when the
55. For a concise definition of attorney skill as the term is used in this paper, see supra Part
I.
56. Sample-selection bias arises "when the availability of the data is influenced by a
selection process that is related to the value of the dependent variable. This selection process can
introduce correlation between the error term and the regressor, which leads to bias .... " JAMES
H. STOCK & MARK W. WATSON, INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMETRICS 250 (2003). The classic
example of sample selection bias occurs in a regression of wages on determinants like education,
years of experience, and geographic location. Only people who have a job have wages, and the
same factors that determine how much money a person makes also determine whether that
person gets a job. Id. at 251.
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penalty is jail time. An oversampling of low-stakes cases only matters
if it somehow biases the estimate of the attorney skill effect. Yet
perhaps attorney skill only makes a difference in these low-stakes
cases; if so, then Abrams and Yoon's estimates would be biased
upward. Thus, while Abrams and Yoon's estimates are more robust
than the estimates of their predecessors, they remain problematic.
III. GOING BEYOND ABRAMS AND YOON'S ANALYSIS: A NEW DATA SET
Abrams and Yoon's landmark paper was revolutionary in the
study of the attorney skill effect, but its shortcomings-its failure to
study prosecuting attorneys, its inability to assess attorney skill
directly, and its failure to study cases with private defending
attorneys-call into question both the accuracy and the external
validity 7 of their estimates. Fortunately, a new data set avoids the
problems of the Abrams and Yoon paper, allowing us to test the
robustness of their results and to extend their research: Evaluation of
Hung Juries in Bronx County, New York, Los Angeles County,
California, Maricopa County, Arizona, and Washington, DC, 2000-
2001.
The National Center for State Courts ("NCSC") originally
compiled these data in order to evaluate the causes of hung juries.58
The data set contains 320 observations from non-capital felony jury
cases resulting in conviction, acquittal, or hung jury in four sites: the
Bronx, Los Angeles, Phoenix, and the District of Columbia. For each
case, the court clerk reported case characteristics and outcomes-
including the race and gender of victims and defendants; the length of
trial and deliberation process; the sentence; and the number of
prosecution and defense witnesses, expert witnesses, and exhibits.
These variables serve as important controls in this study; they
indicate the amount of evidence presented by each side and serve as
indicators of the strength each side's case. Abrams and Yoon argued
that strength-of-case variables were not important in their study
57. External validity is a term commonly used in econometrics that indicates whether the
study is robust enough to extrapolate its results to other situations. See id. at 243-45 (discussing
when an empirical study is subject to threats of external validity).
58. PAULA L. HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., INTER-UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL AND
SOCIAL RESEARCH, EVALUATION OF HUNG JURIES IN BRONX COUNTY, NEW YORK, LOS ANGELES
COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, MARICOPA COUNTY, ARIZONA, AND WASHINGTON, DC, 2000-2001,
http://www.icpsr.umich.edulcocoon/ICPSR/STUDY/03689.xml [hereinafter EVALUATION OF HUNG
JURIES].
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because of the random assignment of public defenders.59 However,
since this data set actually contains strength of case variables, it
allows us to test their assertions.
For each case in this data set, the court clerk distributed a two-
part survey to each juror, attorney, and judge. The first part was
administered at the conclusion of the trial but before jury deliberation;
the second part was administered after the verdict. Thus, the cases in
this data set contain each attorney's, juror's, and judge's reaction to
the verdict, and their evaluation of attorney skill, case complexity, and
evidence. Again, this data set can go beyond the Abrams and Yoon
study, for while they used proxies for attorney skill like education and
years of experience, their data did not have a direct measure of
attorney skill.
Tables I and II give summary statistics for the data set. The
cases are almost equally distributed among the four sites, with the
fewest observations coming from Bronx County, New York. The
defendant sample is overwhelmingly male and black, while the victim
sample is more heterogeneous. Approximately half of the cases
resulted in convictions, and the majority were theft and drug-related
crimes. Almost 80 percent of defendants in this sample were
represented by court-appointed attorneys, suggesting that most
defendants were indigent. Nevertheless, prosecutors averaged
substantially fewer years of practice and previous criminal trials than
the defense attorneys. When these cases at last went to trial, the
prosecution tended to put on more evidence than the defense.
59. Abrams & Yoon, supra note 14, at 1149.
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TABLE I. DATA SUMMARY STATISTICS
Category Variable Observations Percent of Total
Case Type (n=320) Homicide 53 16.56
Rape 18 5.62
Robbery/Burglary/Larceny 88 27.50
Assault (Non-Sexual) 34 10.62
Drug-Related Crime 78 24.37
Attempted Murder 10 3.12
Weapons 16 5.00
Other 23 7.19
Trial Outcome (n=320) Conviction 153 47.81
Acquittal 124 38.75
Hung Jury 43 13.44
Sentence (n=142) Less than 1 Year 7 4.93
1 to 5 Years 40 28.17
5 to 10 Years 29 20.42
10 to 20 Years 21 14.79
Over 20 Years 17 11.97
Life 28 19.72
Defendant Male 271 84.69
Characteristics (n=320) Female 36 11.25
Unknown Gender 13 4.06
White (Non-Hispanic) 31 9.69
Hispanic 86 26.88
Black 181 56.56
Other Non-White 16 5.00
Unknown Race 6 1.88
Victim Characteristics Male 119 37.19
(n=320) Female 71 22.19
Unknown Gender 130 40.63
White (Non-Hispanic) 33 10.31
Hispanic 67 20.94
Black 76 23.75
Other Non-White 14 4.38
Unknown Race 130 40.63
Trial Characteristics Jury Sequestered 21 6.56
(n=320) Court-Appointed Defense Attorney 254 79.38
Retrial 18 5.63
Site of Trial (n=320) Los Angeles, CA 86 26.88
Maricopa County, AZ 80 25.00
Bronx County, NY 55 17.19
Washington, DC 99 30.94
Notes: Evaluation of Hung Juries in Bronx County, New York, Los Angeles County, California
Maricopa County, Arizona, and Washington, DC, 2000-2001 data come from the Inter-Universit3
Consortium for Political and Social Research.
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TABLE II. CASE CHARACTERISTICS
Variable Mean Standard
Deviation
Evidence
Prosecution Witnesses 6.34 5.26
Prosecution Expert Witnesses 0.99 1.27
Prosecution Exhibits 17.50 27.42
Defense Witnesses 2.18 2.50
Defense Expert Witnesses 0.15 0.49
Defense Exhibits 5.12 11.67
Experience
Prosecution Practice Years 8.61 5.13
Prosecution Previous Criminal Trials 39.36 35.59
Defense Practice Years 13.96 7.03
Defense Previous Criminal Trials 71.70 65.57
Length of Trial
Trial Length in Days 4.71 3.47
Minutes of Jury Deliberation 23.74 18.49
Attorney Ratings
(1=Not at all skillful to 7=Very skillful)
Judge Rating of Prosecution 4.90 1.54
Judge Rating of Defense 5.10 1.45
Defense Rating of Prosecution 4.86 0.95
Prosecution Rating of Defense 5.01 0.90
Jury Rating of Prosecution 4.82 0.70
Jury Rating of Defense 4.41 0.76
Complexity Ratings
(1=Not at all complex to 7=Very complex)
Jury Rating of Case Complexity 3.66 0.81
Notes: Evaluation of Hung Juries in Bronx County, New York, Los Angeles County, California,
Maricopa County, Arizona, and Washington, DC, 2000-2001's data come from the Inter-
University Consortium for Political and Social Research.
Notably, this data set contains forty-three cases that resulted
in a hung jury. At first glance, it may appear that the researchers
somehow oversampled hung jury cases-especially since the title of
the data set is Evaluation of Hung Juries. Yet hung juries are much
more common in criminal trials than most people believe-considering
all twelve jurors must reach the same verdict. In fact, the National
Criminal Justice Reference Service, a branch of the U.S. Department
of Justice that collects data on the criminal justice system, estimates
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that approximately 12 percent of trials result in a hung jury-
matching almost perfectly with this data set's 13.44 percent.60
These detailed and unique observations have been previously
unobtainable, preventing any broad studies of the effect of attorney
skill in the courtroom. Accordingly, -this new data set can provide
valuable insight into the influence of attorney skill on the trial
outcome of the everyday defendant.
IV. MODELING THE ATTORNEY SKILL EFFECT
Using the NCSC data, I begin my analysis with a basic probit
model to estimate the effects of attorney skill on the trial outcome:
Pr(convicted = 1) = <D[,6o + /pattyskill + / 2 dattyskilli + /33pwitnessi +/ 4 pewitness +#/3spexhibit,
+ ,3,dwitnessi + /,dewitness, + /,dexhibit, +/,3vfemale, + ,vblack, + f,3vhisp, + ,l 2 votherrace
+ /, 3dfemale + /, 4dblack, + /,Jdhispi + A,,,dotherrace, + 31 crimeFE, + e, ]
In this model, the dependent variable is the probability of being
convicted. I model trial outcome in this manner because, like
acquittal, most defendants consider a hung jury as a victory. A new
trial requires considerable resources, so after a hung jury, the District
Attorney's office must decide whether to pursue lesser charges or to
pursue the case at all.61 The variables pwitness, pewitness, and
pexhibit (the number of prosecution witnesses, expert witnesses, and
exhibits, respectively) control for the strength of the prosecution's
case, while the variables dwitness, dewitness, and dexhibit (the
number of defense witnesses, expert witnesses, and exhibits,
respectively) control for the strength of the defense's case. 62 In
60. NAT'L CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERV., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF FREQUENCY OF
OCCURRENCE, CAUSES, EFFECTS, AND AMOUNT OF TIME CONSUMED BY HUNG JURIES: FINAL
REPORT (1975), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=19026. This
study was originally published in 1975, and so is somewhat old. However, according to the
researchers who compiled EVALUATION OF HUNG JURIES, supra note 58, most current statistics
on hung juries come from studies in the 1960s and 1970s, further motivating their project.
61. Recently, a prosecutor's decision whether to pursue a retrial has received a lot of
publicity after the second hung jury in a Miami terrorism case. Six men are accused of planning
to bomb the Sears Tower in Chicago and the FBI offices in Miami, yet two different juries have
been unable to reach a verdict. Curt Anderson, Jury Hits Stalemate in Terrorism Retrial, USA
TODAY, Apr. 11, 2008, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-04-11-
3235714827 x.htm.
62. Individually, measures like the number of prosecution witnesses could be challenged as
imperfect controls for the strength of the prosecution's case; for example, the prosecution could
plausibly base their entire case on the testimony of one eyewitness. But together, these variables
demonstrate the relative matchup of resources and evidence on both sides.
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addition, the list of defendant and victim personal characteristic
variables control for any potential effects of race or gender on trial
outcome. The crime fixed-effect variables, 63 crimeFE, control for any
systematic effects related to the type of crime and include dummy
variables for homicide, rape, theft crimes, and drug crimes. Finally,
the data set contains three different measures of prosecutor attorney
skill, pattyskill, and defense attorney skill, dattyskill. As a result, I
will estimate this basic model three times: the first using judge-
evaluated attorney skill, the second using attorney-evaluated attorney
skill, and the third using jury-evaluated attorney skill.
In the second part of my analysis, I will consider the influence
of these same factors on sentence length using an ordered probit
model:
Pr(sentence = j) = <I[,O + / 1pattyskill, + /Jdattyskilli + f3zpwitness, + J4 pewitness, + /,Jpexhibit,
+ /Jdwitness, + /,dewitness, + ,8 dexhibit, + /Jvfemale, + fJovblack, + /,Jvhispi + /,ivotherrace,
+ /31 dfemale, + I14dblack, + /,,dhisp, + /,3,dotherrace, + /,JcrimeFE +ei ]
In this model, j ranges from one to seven and is based on the NCSC's
rating of sentence length, with one representing less than a year in
prison and seven representing life in prison. This analysis relies on
the same controls as the previous regression analysis and will only
focus on individuals whose prison sentence length is positive. 64
In their 2007 study, Abrams and Yoon found that defense
attorney skill had a statistically significant impact on trial outcome.65
If the Abrams and Yoon results-not to mention the anecdotal
evidence of attorney skill in the popular press-are correct, then the
effect of defense attorney skill should be negative on trial outcome and
sentence, while the effect of prosecution attorney skill should be
positive. Thus, fli should be greater than zero, and /2 should be less
than zero in all three versions of both regressions. This model will
therefore test the robustness of Abrams and Yoon's results as well as
the media's claims.
63. The fixed-effect variables allow each type of crime to have its own intercept; this is
useful if, for example, defendants in murder cases are systematically more likely to be convicted
than defendants in theft cases. See WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 193-200 (6th
ed. 2008) (giving a technically rigorous discussion of fixed effects regression); STOCK & WATSON,
supra note 56, at 278-83 (giving a basic overview of fixed effects regression).
64. Because only eleven defendants in the sample were convicted but not sentenced to
prison, these defendants are not included in the sentencing analysis.
65. Abrams & Yoon, supra note 14, at 1173-74.
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V. RESULTS
The results demonstrate that Abrams and Yoon's analysis was,
at best, incomplete. The skill of the prosecuting attorney has a
statistically significant effect on trial outcomes, yet the skill of the
defense attorney does not. Table III reports the results of a linear
probability analysis of conviction, which is valuable for its ease of
interpretation.66 Table IV gives the results of the probit regression,
and Table V reports the marginal effects from the probit regression. In
each table, specifications one, two, and three use the judge, opposing
attorney, and jury ratings, respectively, as a measure of attorney skill.
Specification four adds the jury's case-complexity rating to the jury
attorney skill rating specification. The jury case complexity variable
can help control for jury confusion, which might have effects on jurors'
perception of the attorneys and the trial outcome. To ease readability,
Tables III, IV, and V only report the coefficients most relevant to this
analysis. For the full regression results, see Appendix Tables I, II,
and III.
66. The results of a linear probability analysis are easier to interpret than the results of a
probit analysis because the coefficients can be multiplied by one hundred and interpreted as
percentage effects. STOCK & WATSON, supra note 56, at 299-302 (giving a basic overview of the
linear probability model and how to interpret it). But see GREENE, supra note 63, at 772-73
(discussing problems with the linear probability model despite its ease of interpretation).
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TABLE III. LINEAR PROBABILITY MODEL OF CONVICTION
Judge Skill Opposing Jury Skill Ratings
Ratings Attorney Skill
Ratings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prosecution Skill Rating 0.004 0.054 0.216** 0.228**
(0.020) (0.036) (0.039) (0.039)
Defense Skill Rating -0.021 -0.004 -0.031 -0.027
(0.020) (0.034) (0.037) (0.037)
Jury-Rated Complexity - - - -0.065+
(0.038)
Court-Appointed Attorney 0.026 0.013 0.015 0.005
(0.073) (0.076) (0.072) (0.073)
# of Pros. Witnesses 0.008 0.012 0.005 0.007
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
# of Pros. Experts -0.022 -0.017 -0.040+ -0.032
(0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
# of Pros. Exhibits 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
# of Def. Witnesses -0.021+ -0.018 -0.031** -0.032**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011)
# of Def. Experts 0.148* 0.189** 0.201** 0.209**
(0.058) (0.060) (0.050) (0.052)
# of Def. Exhibits 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.325* -0.127 -0.641* -0.500+
(0.152) (0.263) (0.283) (0.297)
Observations 317 297 315 315
Adjusted R-squared 0.14 0.18 0.23 0.24
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Notes: Evaluation of Hung Juries in Bronx County, New York, Los Angeles County, California,
Maricopa County, Arizona, and Washington, DC, 2000-2001 data come from the Inter-
University Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dependent variable is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if defendant was convicted. Specification 1 uses measures of attorney skill
as rated by the judge. In specification 2, the skill measures come from the opposing
attorney-the defense rates the prosecution, and the prosecution rates the defense.
Specifications 3 and 4 both use the average of the jurors' attorney skill ratings, and
specification 4 adds the jurors' average case complexity rating to control for any effects of
juror confusion on attorney skill ratings. Controls for the race and gender of both the victim
and defendant as well as crime fixed effects are included in each specification; for full results,
see Appendix Table I. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Dummy
variables for missing values of victim race and victim gender included in regression but not
reported.
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TABLE IV. PROBIT MODEL OF CONVICTION
Judge Opposing Jury Skill Ratings
Skill Attorney Skill
Ratings Ratings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prosecution Skill Rating 0.020 0.133 0.717** 0.762**
(0.059) (0.106) (0.141) (0.144)
Defense Skill Rating -0.044 -0.014 -0.117 -0.105
(0.060) (0.100) (0.126) (0.127)
Jury-Rated Complexity - - - -0.231+
(0.128)
Court-Appointed Attorney 0.152 0.116 0.082 0.055
(0.209) (0.222) (0.226) (0.228)
# of Pros. Witnesses -0.022 -0.001 -0.043 -0.037
(0.030) (0.031) (0.032) (0.033)
# of Pros. Experts -0.104 -0.084 -0.170* -0.145+
(0.068) (0.070) (0.079) (0.081)
# of Pros. Exhibits 0.036** 0.029** 0.042** 0.042**
(0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011)
# of Def. Witnesses -0.095* -0.082* -0.141** -0.144**
(0.039) (0.041) (0.040) (0.042)
# of Def. Experts 0.522* 0.641** 0.822** 0.844**
(0.207) (0.215) (0.215) (0.216)
# of Def. Exhibits 0.012 0.013 0.011+ 0.013+
(0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
Constant -0.856+ -1.937* -4.096** -3.599**
(0.482) (0.810) (0.985) (1.012)
Observations 317 297 315 315
Pseudo R-Squared 0.19 0.22 0.28 0.29
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Notes: Evaluation of Hung Juries in Bronx County, New York, Los Angeles County, California,
Maricopa County, Arizona, and Washington, DC, 2000-2001 data come from the Inter-
University Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dependent variable is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if defendant was convicted. Specification 1 uses measures of attorney skill
as rated by the judge. In specification 2, the skill measures come from the opposing attorney-
the defense rates the prosecution, and the prosecution rates the defense. Specifications 3 and
4 both use the average of the jurors' attorney skill ratings, and specification 4 adds the jurors'
average case complexity rating to control for any effects of juror confusion on attorney skill
ratings. Controls for the race and gender of both the victim and defendant as well as crime
fixed effects are included in each specification; for full results, see Appendix Table II.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Dummy variables for missing
values of victim race and victim gender included in regression but not reported.
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TABLE V. PROBIT MODEL OF CONVICTION (MARGINAL EFFECTS)
Judge Skill Opposing Jury Skill Ratings
Ratings Attorney Skill
Ratings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prosecution Skill Rating 0.008 0.053 0.286** 0.304**
(0.024) (0.042) (0.056) (0.057)
Defense Skill Rating -0.017 -0.005 -0.047 -0.042
(0.024) (0.040) (0.050) (0.050)
Jury-Rated Complexity - - - -0.092+
(0.05 1)
Court-Appointed Attorney 0.060 0.046 0.033 0.022
(0.083) (0.088) (0.090) (0.091)
# of Pros. Witnesses -0.009 -0.001 -0.017 -0.015
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
# of Pros. Experts -0.042 -0.033 -0.068* -0.058+
(0.027) (0.028) (0.032) (0.032)
# of Pros. Exhibits 0.014** 0.012** 0.017** 0.017**
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
# of Def. Witnesses -0.038* -0.033* -0.056** -0.057**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
# of Def. Experts 0.208* 0.256** 0.328** 0.337**
(0.083) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086)
# of Def. Exhibits 0.005 0.005 0.005+ 0.005+
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 317 297 315 315
Pseudo R-Squared 0.19 0.22 0.28 0.29
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Notes: Evaluation of Hung Juries in Bronx County, New York, Los Angeles County, California,
Maricopa County, Arizona, and Washington, DC, 2000-2001 data come from the Inter-
University Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dependent variable is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if defendant was convicted. Specification 1 uses measures of attorney skill
as rated by the judge. In specification 2, the skill measures come from the opposing attorney-
the defense rates the prosecution, and the prosecution rates the defense. Specifications 3 and
4 both use the average of the jurors' attorney skill ratings, and specification 4 adds the jurors'
average case complexity rating to control for any effects of juror confusion on attorney skill
ratings. Controls for the race and gender of both the victim and defendant as well as crime
fixed effects are included in each specification; for full results, see Appendix Table III.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Dummy variables for missing
values of victim race and victim gender included in regression but not reported.
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TABLE VI. LINEAR PROBABILITY MODEL OF SENTENCING
Judge Skill Ratings Opposing Jury Skill Ratings
Attorney Skill
Ratings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prosecution Skill Rating -0.053 0.155 -0.213 -0.293
(0.094) (0.136) (0.295) (0.295)
Defense Skill Rating 0.106 0.197 -0.295 -0.346
(0.085) (0.143) (0.243) (0.244)
Jury-Rated Complexity - - - 0.292
(0.191)
Court-Appointed Attorney -0.436 -0.422 -0.369 -0.246
(0.311) (0.325) (0.327) (0.338)
# of Pros. Witnesses 0.086** 0.084* 0.063+ 0.054
(0.030) (0.034) (0.033) (0.035)
# of Pros. Experts -0.190* -0.212* -0.147 -0.177+
(0.086) (0.093) (0.096) (0.097)
# of Pros. Exhibits -0.004 -0.005 -0.001 -0.001
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
# of Def. Witnesses 0.018 0.003 0.054 0.069
(0.059) (0.062) (0.065) (0.067)
# of Def. Experts -0.152 -0.019 -0.136 -0.037
(0.355) (0.373) (0.366) (0.368)
# of Def. Exhibits -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 -0.010
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Constant 1.327 0.140 3.717+ 3.379
(0.859) (0.971) (2.191) (2.212)
Observations 141 132 141 141
Adjusted R-squared 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.42
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Notes: Evaluation of Hung Juries in Bronx County, New York, Los Angeles County, California,
Maricopa County, Arizona, and Washington, DC, 2000-2001 data come from the Inter-University
Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dependent variable is a discrete sentencing
variable ranging from 1 to 7, with 1 representing less than 1 year in prison, and 7 representing
life in prison. Specification 1 uses measures of attorney skill as rated by the judge. In
specification 2, the skill measures come from the opposing attorney-the defense rates the
prosecution, and the prosecution rates the defense. Specifications 3 and 4 both use the average of
the jurors' attorney skill ratings, and specification 4 adds the jurors' average case complexity
rating to control for any effects of juror confusion on attorney skill ratings. Controls for the race
and gender of both the victim and defendant as well as crime fixed effects are included in each
specification; for full results, see Appendix Table IV. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors
In parentheses. Dummy variables for missing values of victim race and victim gender included in
regression but not revorted.
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TABLE VII. ORDERED PROBIT MODEL OF SENTENCING
Judge Skill Opposing Jury Skill Ratings
Ratings Attorney Skill
Ratings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prosecution Skill Rating -0.035 0.152 -0.196 -0.276
(0.084) (0.123) (0.266) (0.265)
Defense Skill Rating 0.093 0.205 -0.292 -0.359
(0.084) (0.126) (0.219) (0.223)
Jury-Rated Complexity - - - 0.306+
(0.167)
Court-Appointed Attorney -0.278 -0.244 -0.228 -0.095
(0.291) (0.305) (0.298) (0.311)
# of Pros. Witnesses 0.082** 0.081** 0.061* 0.050
(0.027) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031)
# of Pros. Experts -0.175* -0.201* -0.141 -0.169+
(0.083) (0.089) (0.090) (0.092)
# of Pros. Exhibits -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.000
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
# ofDef. Witnesses 0.013 0.003 0.047 0.055
(0.055) (0.058) (0.060) (0.059)
# of Def. Experts -0.009 0.132 0.030 0.127
(0.293) (0.302) (0.303) (0.313)
# of Def. Exhibits -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 -0.010+
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 141 132 141 141
Pseudo R-Squared 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.21
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Notes: Evaluation of Hung Juries in Bronx County, New York, Los Angeles County, California
Maricopa County, Arizona, and Washington, DC, 2000-2001 data come from the Inter-University
Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dependent variable is a discrete sentencing
variable ranging from 1 to 7, with 1 representing less than 1 year in prison, and 7 representing
life in prison. Specification 1 uses measures of attorney skill as rated by the judge. In
specification 2, the skill measures come from the opposing attorney-the defense rates thE
prosecution, and the prosecution rates the defense. Specifications 3 and 4 both use the average
of the jurors' attorney skill ratings, and specification 4 adds the jurors' average case complexity
rating to control for any effects of juror confusion on attorney skill ratings. Controls for the race
and gender of both the victim and defendant as well as crime fixed effects are included in eacl.
specification; for full results, see Appendix Table V. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors ir
parentheses. Dummy variables for missing values of victim race and victim gender included ir
regression but not reported.
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As Tables III, IV, and V demonstrate, the judge and opposing
attorneys' ratings of skill are not statistically significant. In other
words, the judges' and opposing attorneys' perceptions of attorney skill
have no effect on trial outcome. However, the jurors' rating of the
prosecuting attorneys' skill level is highly significant. According to
specification four, for every one-point increase in a juror's rating of the
prosecution, the probability of conviction increases by 30.4 percent.
Moreover, for every one-point increase in a juror's rating of case
complexity, the probability of conviction decreases by 9.2 percent. A
skillful prosecuting attorney can drastically increase the defendant's
chances of being convicted. Yet a skillful defense attorney has no such
effect-the jurors' rating of defense attorney skill is never significant.
Overall, the results appear robust since the coefficients on the
control variables are statistically significant and have the expected
signs. Number of prosecution exhibits, for example, has a positive
coefficient, and number of defense witnesses has a negative coefficient.
These results make sense because more exhibits typically imply a
stronger case against the defendant, while more defense witnesses
typically imply a stronger case for the defendant. Interestingly,
number of defense experts has a positive coefficient, so more defense
experts actually increases the probability of being convicted. Perhaps
a defendant only needs a large number of experts if the prosecution
has a substantial amount of evidence against him. In all
specifications, indigent defendants are not worse off even though they
have government-paid, court-appointed attorneys. Other notable
results include that female defendants are less likely to be convicted,
while cases with female and black victims are more likely to result in
conviction.67
Table VI gives the results of a linear probability analysis of
sentencing, which is again useful for its ease of interpretation, 6 8 and
Table VII reports the results of the ordered probit regression of
sentencing. As in the previous tables, Tables VI and VII only report
the most relevant coefficients; the full results are available in
Appendix Tables IV and V. In these regressions, the significance of
skill level disappears in all specifications. Attorney skill is no longer
an important factor. In fact, the most significant factors in sentencing
are type of crime-which should be expected due to minimum
67. See app. tbl.I.
68. See supra note 66 (explaining how to interpret the results of a linear probability
analysis).
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sentencing laws-and the jury's rating of case complexity. Perhaps the
most complex cases are also more severe-for example, a first-degree
murder case is likely more complex than a manslaughter or a drug
case-which would explain the positive effect on sentence length.
VI. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The results here are quite surprising. During celebrity trials,
the media touts the importance of a good defense attorney 69-a belief
endorsed by the Abrams and Yoon study.70 Yet according to these
results, the skill level of the defense attorney plays no role in
determining the outcome of a criminal trial in everyday cases with
non-celebrity defendants. Instead, the prosecution's skill level is
crucial to the verdict. A guilty person may be more likely to walk free
when the prosecution performs poorly, and an innocent person may be
more likely to land in jail when the prosecution performs well.
Nevertheless, the results are highly intuitive. The
prosecution-not the defense-has the burden of proving each element
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.71 In fact, while the defense
will almost certainly put on some evidence to negate the prosecutor's
assertions, the defendant need not put on any evidence at all. 7 2 In a
criminal trial, the ball is in the prosecution's court; if it drops the ball,
then a defendant win is almost inevitable. As a result, a defendant's
conviction or acquittal is determined by much more than just guilt or
innocence.
Whenever factors other than guilt or innocence determine trial
outcomes, then we must be concerned about the innocent being
convicted and the guilty walking away. Recently, legal scholars have
been concerned with other highly variable components of our criminal
justice system-such as the decision to bring a defendant to trial or to
exclude evidence-that may lead to erroneous trial outcomes.73
69. See, e.g., Cartwright, supra note 8, at 1 (describing the media's reaction to the verdict in
the murder trial of millionaire Robert Durst); Risling, supra note 7, at 3 (describing the media's
reaction to the verdict in the murder trial of Robert Blake); Roberts et al., supra note 6, at A10
(describing the media's reaction to the verdict in the child molestation trial of Michael Jackson).
70. Abrams & Yoon, supra note 14, at 1173-75.
71. 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 941 (2008).
72. 1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 2:9 (15th ed. 2008).
73. See, e.g., Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We
Reliably Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1394 (1997) ("Advantages which may
enhance the case of the guilty defendant such as the right to silence and to exclude relevant
inculpatory evidence, work no benefit for the innocent. Instead, those advantages justify the
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Variability in prosecutor skill would serve only to compound these
other problems and lead to more verdicts that are erroneous.
The importance of the prosecution's skill also indicates the
need for a policy change in District Attorney hiring and salary
practices. As Tables I and II indicate, prosecutors are vastly less
experienced than defense attorneys-in fact, many prosecutors are
fresh out of law school. The relative inexperience of prosecutors is not
just an anomaly of this data set. Indeed, a recent article in the Florida
Bar Journal blamed the growth in prison inmate populations on the
inexperienced state prosecutors who had almost complete discretion
over the charges filed, plea deals offered, and sentences
recommended. 74 "The problem of inexperienced prosecutors," lamented
the article, "is compounded by the budget crisis, which forces drastic
turnover in prosecutors' offices. Salary disparities exist between
assistant state prosecutors and not just private attorneys, but also all
other government attorneys, save those working in legal aid." 7 5
The problems created by low salaries in prosecutors' offices
reach far beyond Florida. In his nationwide study of U.S. Attorneys'
offices, Richard Boylan found that higher salaries led to improved
attorney retention and performance.76 Similarly, economists Jeff
Biddle and Daniel Hamermesh pointed out the enormous earnings
difference between attorneys in the private and public sectors-
private attorneys make 158 percent more than their public
counterparts-creating incentives for law students to obtain a private-
sector job, if possible.77 The incentives are particularly great for high
achievers: the percentage returns to higher class rank and serving on
prosecution's withholding from the accused and the factfinder evidence which might undermine
the prosecution's case."); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful
Convictions: A Thought Experiment in the Regulation of Prosecutors, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1, 57 (2009)
(arguing that "the problem of false convictions implicates aspects of prosecutors' professional
conduct that might plausibly be regulated by the legal ethics codes"). These variations in our
criminal justice system led legal scholar John Merryman to joke that "if he were innocent, he
would prefer to be tried by a civil law court, but that if he were guilty, he would prefer to be tried
by a common law court." JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 132 (2d ed. 1985).
74. Aaron M. Clemens & Hale R. Stancil, Unhandcuffing Justice: Proposals to Return
Rationality to Criminal Sentencing, FLA. B. J., Feb. 2009, at 54.
75. Id.
76. See Boylan, supra note 41, at 76 (finding that lower salaries lead to higher turnover,
and higher turnover leads to lower output).
77. See Jeff E. Biddle & Daniel S. Hamermesh, Beauty, Productivity, and Discrimination:
Lawyers' Looks and Lucre, 16 J. LAB. ECON. 172, 193 (1998) (finding a raw earnings difference of
158 percent between attorneys in the private and public sectors that did not disappear after
controlling for productivity).
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a law journal are greater in the private sector.78 This research
suggests that because government jobs do not pay as well as private
sector jobs, some prosecutors may take their job because they finished
in the lower half of their law school class. Their high-achieving
classmates snatched up all of the private-sector jobs, and the public
sector was the only option available. The importance of prosecuting
attorney skill level for trial outcomes, however, suggests that it would
be beneficial for the government to increase pay. Not only would a pay
increase improve the quality of attorneys working in prosecutors'
offices by attracting the best and the brightest, but it would also
reduce the incentives for good prosecutors to leave and take higher-
paying jobs in the private sector.79
Even if cash-strapped government budgets prevent across-the-
board pay increases for prosecutors, the government can still reduce
variation in prosecutor skill and improve overall quality by providing
training programs for prosecutors. District Attorneys' offices could
institute mentoring programs that assign more experienced
prosecutors to assist and support the newcomers. These offices could
also prohibit new prosecutors from serving as chief counsel in felony
cases until they have several months of experience. Finally, the offices
could institute an internal monitoring system to track each
prosecutor's performance. At the conclusion of a trial, the prosecution
could ask third parties-perhaps victims, victims' families, or even
judges-to complete a survey rating the performance of the
prosecution.80 The office could then require prosecutors with
consistently bad ratings to work under prosecutors with good ratings.
The ratings could also assist in promotion and retention decisions.81
Interestingly, the regression results also indicate that
defendants represented by court-appointed attorneys fare no worse in
the courtroom than defendants represented by private attorneys. The
coefficient on the court-appointed attorney variable is never
statistically significant, indicating no effect on trial outcome or
78. Id. at 195.
79. These suggestions are strengthened by Boylan's result that lower salaries for U.S.
Attorneys lead to higher turnover and lower job performance. Boylan, supra note 41, at 75.
80. These surveys could be similar to the ones used to create EVALUATION OF HUNG JURIES.
See supra note 58 (describing the data collection process).
81. Other scholars have also argued for prosecutor training programs. E.g., Zacharias &
Green, supra note 73, at 19 (arguing that a training program "encourages prosecutors to temper
overzealousness and consider how their behavior can produce untoward results").
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sentencing. 82 Groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union
("ACLU") advocate for change in this area, citing the inadequacy of
the current public defense system:
The Sixth Amendment guarantees every person accused of a crime the right to an
attorney for his or her defense, regardless of ability to pay, and the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees all citizens equal rights regardless of race or national origin.
Yet all too often, these rights are violated by indigent defense systems that leave low-
income people, including many people of color, without adequate representation. 83
In fact, the principal motivation for economist Radha Iyengar
to study the indigent defense system was the fact that "[t]he right to
an equal and fair trial regardless of wealth is a hallmark of American
jurisprudence."84 Yet contrary to her results and to the claims of the
ACLU, the results of the present study suggest that indigent
defendants are getting an equal and fair trial regardless of wealth. If
such inequality exists, it occurs before trial during the plea bargaining
stage,85 not at trial itself. Once again, the results indicate that
scholars concerned about inequitable trial outcomes have been
focusing on the wrong side. They have been so preoccupied with the
importance of the defense attorney that they forgot about the
prosecution.
These results have certainly demonstrated the importance of a
good prosecuting attorney, and the data set has allowed this Note to
go beyond all previous studies of the attorney skill effect. Yet this data
set-like all data sets-does have some limitations. For instance, this
sample may obscure the effect of a good defense attorney. Because the
sample contains only 320 observations, and 80 percent of the
attorneys are court-appointed for indigent defendants, the sample may
not contain any especially skillful defense attorneys. There are
probably no Johnnie Cochrans in this sample. Nevertheless, the
sample paints a more realistic picture of the everyday criminal justice
system. No matter how much money the defendant spends on an
attorney, he will probably never get a Johnnie Cochran. As a result,
82. In case the court-appointed attorney variable is highly correlated with the defense
attorney skill measure, all regression specifications were re-estimated without the court-
appointed attorney dummy variable. The results did not change.
83. American Civil Liberties Union, Criminal Justice: Indigent Defense,
http://www.aclu.org/crimjustice/indigent/index.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2009).
84. Iyengar, supra note 45, at 2.
85. Since this data set does not contain information on defendants who did not go to trial,
we cannot test this possibility here. This possibility is worth mentioning here, however, because
the results of the present study do not preclude possible inequitable treatment before trial.
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the everyday defendant cannot simply hire a good lawyer to avoid
conviction.
This Note has also failed to demonstrate that the effects of
attorney skill last into the sentencing phase. Perhaps when judges or
juries sentence convicted defendants, they only look at the strength of
the case. However, the general lack of significance in the sentencing
regressions suggests that attorney skill effects may be the victim of
small sample size-only 142 of the defendants in this sample were
sentenced to prison. Moreover, since sentencing data are only
available in ranges, and not continuously in years, attorney skill
effects may be further obscured. Because of minimum sentencing laws,
attorney skill effects probably affect only one or two years in prison-
not ten or twenty. These unfortunate limiting characteristics of the
data set suggest a rich area for future research.
This data set has its limitations. Yet it offers a unique
opportunity to observe the effect of raw attorney skill on trial
outcomes without all the problems of the Abrams and Yoon study.
Moreover, the results of this study suggest that perhaps we have been
asking the wrong question. The media, the ACLU, and most scholars
are disproportionately concerned with the effect of the defense
attorney's skill on trial outcome. Instead, this study suggests that we
should be much more concerned with the prosecuting attorney's skill.
Perhaps scholarly focus has been heavier on defense attorney skill
because the defendant can often control who represents him in court,
but he cannot control who prosecutes him. Nevertheless, the results of
this study suggest that the selection of the prosecutor can determine
who goes to jail and who goes home.
VII. CONCLUSION
O.J. Simpson's "Dream Team" may have been a "Scheme
Team" as Fred Goldman suggested, but their skillfulness probably did
not carry the day.86 Instead, author Scott Turow had it right when he
blamed the prosecution. Turow did not use Johnnie Cochran's racial
appeals and clever slogans to explain the O.J. Simpson verdict; on the
contrary, he believed:
Because the prosecutors routinely accepted even the most unlikely stories from
police officers, they were unable to recognize Mr. Fuhrman [the lead police detective] as
a genuinely bad character. By the time news of Mr. Fuhrman's background began to
emerge, prosecutors were hip-joined to him, their star witness-a foul-mouthed racist
86. Margolick, supra note 1, at Al.
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cop, the latest poster boy of the Los Angeles Police Department, his image hanging on
the wall of the public mind next to those of the officers who beat Rodney King.
The jury made them pay.87
The O.J. Simpson jury made clumsy prosecutors pay. Before
this study, however, the results of the O.J. Simpson trial hardly
seemed extendable to the everyday criminal trial. After all, the O.J.
Simpson case was the "trial of the century."88
Yet as the results of this Note have shown, the prosecution
plays a critical role in everyday criminal trials. An unskilled
prosecutor can increase the likelihood of a hung jury or acquittal-no
matter how strong the case is against the defendant. Thus, while the
O.J. Simpson trial was an extraordinary one, it was not an anomaly.
Even in everyday trials, the jury will make clumsy prosecutors pay.
And as long as the jury makes clumsy prosecutors pay, defendants will
continue to slip away from justice.
Jennifer Bennett Shinall*
87. Turow, supra note 5, at A21 (emphasis added).
88. Frank Rich, Judge Ito's All-Star Vaudeville, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1994, at E17.
* Candidate for Doctor of Philosophy in Law and Economics and Doctor of Jurisprudence,
May 2012. I would like to thank Professor Paige Skiba for her suggestions and invaluable
assistance in getting this data set into working form. The VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW editorial
board also worked tirelessly to get this Note and the tables into a publishable format. A special
thanks goes to my husband, Ricky, for his unfailing support, and to my mother, Kathy, for
proofreading everything I have ever written from first grade to graduate school.
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APPENDIX TABLE I. FULL LINEAR PROBABILITY MODEL OF
CONVICTION
Judge Skill Opposing Jury Skill Ratings
Ratings Attorney Skill
Ratings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prosecution Skill Rating 0.004 0.054 0.216** 0.228**
(0.020) (0.036) (0.039) (0.039)
Defense Skill Rating -0.021 -0.004 -0.031 -0.027
(0.020) (0.034) (0.037) (0.037)
Jury-Rated Complexity - - -0.065+
(0.038)
Defendant Female -0.137 -0.133 -0.149+ -0.173+
(0.096) (0.100) (0.085) (0.089)
Defendant Hispanic -0.017 0.018 0.028 0.018
(0.106) (0.113) (0.105) (0.105)
Defendant Black -0.217* -0.179+ -0.167 -0.173+
(0.098) (0.105) (0.102) (0.102)
Defendant Other Non-White 0.155 0.193 0.227 0.204
(0.151) (0.150) (0.140) (0.140)
Victim Female 0.200* 0.240** 0.238** 0.239**
(0.082) (0.083) (0.077) (0.077)
Victim Hispanic 0.037 0.091 0.041 0.072
(0.099) (0.108) (0.090) (0.092)
Victim Black 0.250* 0.310** 0.272** 0.286**
(0.103) (0.109) (0.095) (0.095)
Victim Other Non-White 0.301 0.453* 0.252+ 0.257+
(0.183) (0.183) (0.152) (0.153)
Homicide -0.050 -0.025 -0.073 -0.039
(0.087) (0.087) (0.085) (0.090)
Rape 0.375** 0.433** 0.349** 0.374**
(0.133) (0.139) (0.114) (0.113)
Robbery/Theft/Larceny 0.025 -0.023 0.018 0.023
(0.075) (0.076) (0.070) (0.069)
Drug Related 0.159+ 0.166+ 0.153* 0.161*
(0.081) (0.086) (0.077) (0.077)
Court-Appointed Attorney 0.026 0.013 0.015 0.005
(0.073) (0.076) (0.072) (0.073)
# of Pros. Witnesses 0.008 0.012 0.005 0.007
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
# of Pros. Experts -0.022 -0.017 -0.040+ -0.032
(0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
# of Pros. Exhibits 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
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# of Def. Witnesses 
-0.021+ -0.018 -0.031** -0.032**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011)
# of Def. Experts 0.148* 0.189** 0.201** 0.209**
(0.058) (0.060) (0.050) (0.052)
# of Def. Exhibits 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.325* -0.127 -0.641* -0.500+
(0.152) (0.263) (0.283) (0.297)
Observations 317 297 315 315
Adjusted R-squared 0.14 0.18 0.23 0.24
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Notes: Evaluation of Hung Juries in Bronx County, New York, Los Angeles County, California,
Maricopa County, Arizona, and Washington, DC, 2000-2001 data come from the Inter-
University Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dependent variable is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if defendant was convicted. Specification 1 uses measures of attorney skill
as rated by the judge. In specification 2, the skill measures come from the opposing
attorney-the defense rates the prosecution, and the prosecution rates the defense.
Specifications 3 and 4 both use the average of the jurors' attorney skill ratings, and
specification 4 adds the jurors' average case complexity rating to control for any effects of
juror confusion on attorney skill ratings. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in
parentheses. Dummy variables for missing values of victim race and victim gender included
in regression but not reported.
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APPENDIX TABLE II. FULL PROBIT MODEL OF CONVICTION
Judge Opposing Jury Skill Ratings
Skill Attorney Skill
___________________ Ratings Ratings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prosecution Skill Rating 0.020 0.133 0.717** 0.762**
(0.059) (0.106) (0.141) (0.144)
Defense Skill Rating -0.044 -0.014 -0.117 -0.105
(0.060) (0.100) (0.126) (0.127)
Jury-Rated Complexity - - -0.231+
(0.128)
Defendant Female -0.361 -0.348 -0.514+ -0.590+
(0.295) (0.315) (0.311) (0.328)
Defendant Hispanic -0.057 0.058 0.070 0.006
(0.309) (0.334) (0.351) (0.351)
Defendant Black -0.680* -0.573+ -0.544 -0.588+
(0.291) (0.314) (0.336) (0.330)
Defendant Other Non-White 0.557 0.647 0.871+ 0.766
(0.464) (0.471) (0.487) (0.485)
Victim Female 0.729** 0.798** 0.955** 0.953**
(0.247) (0.259) (0.257) (0.264)
Victim Hispanic 0.292 0.462 0.524 0.655
(0.334) (0.405) (0.387) (0.406)
Victim Black 0.882** 1.078** 1.215** 1.282**
(0.336) (0.401) (0.387) (0.402)
Victim Other Non-White 0.784 1.259+ 0.951 0.998
(0.658) (0.676) (0.625) (0.632)
Homicide -0.265 -0.184 -0.286 -0.183
(0.269) (0.264) (0.270) (0.281)
Rape 1.053* 1.236** 1.131** 1.222**
(0.411) (0.459) (0.388) (0.389
Robbery/Theft/Larceny 0.038 -0.103 0.034 0.038
(0.225) (0.229) (0.234) (0.236)
Drug Related 0.492* 0.496* 0.499* 0.521*
(0.226) (0.238) (0.239) (0.239)
Court-Appointed Attorney 0.152 0.116 0.082 0.055
(0.209) (0.222) (0.226) (0.228)
# of Pros. Witnesses -0.022 -0.001 -0.043 -0.037
(0.030) (0.031) (0.032) (0.033)
# of Pros. Experts -0.104 -0.084 -0.170* -0.145+
(0.068) (0.070) (0.079) (0.081)
# of Pros. Exhibits 0.036** 0.029** 0.042** 0.042**
(0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011)
# of Def. Witnesses -0.095* -0.082* -0.141** -0.144**
(0.039) (0.041) (0.040) (0.042)
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# of Def. Experts 0.522* 0.641** 0.822** 0.844**
(0.207) (0.215) (0.215) (0.216)
# of Def. Exhibits 0.012 0.013 0.011+ 0.013+
(0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
Constant -0.856+ -1.937* -4.096** -3.599**
(0.482) (0.810) (0.985) (1.012)
Observations 317 297 315 315
Pseudo R-Squared 0.19 0.22 0.28 0.29
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Notes: Evaluation of Hung Juries in Bronx County, New York, Los Angeles County, California,
Maricopa County, Arizona, and Washington, DC, 2000-2001 data come from the Inter-
University Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dependent variable is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if defendant was convicted. Specification 1 uses measures of attorney skill
as rated by the judge. In specification 2, the skill measures come from the opposing attorney-
the defense rates the prosecution, and the prosecution rates the defense. Specifications 3 and
4 both use the average of the jurors' attorney skill ratings, and specification 4 adds the jurors'
average case complexity rating to control for any effects of juror confusion on attorney skill
ratings. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Dummy variables for
missing values of victim race and victim gender included in regression but not reported.
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APPENDIX TABLE III. FULL PROBIT MODEL OF CONVICTION
(MARGINAL EFFECTS)
Judge Skill Opposing Jury Skill Ratings
Ratings Attorney Skill
Ratings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prosecution Skill Rating 0.008 0.053 0.286** 0.304**
(0.024) (0.042) (0.056) (0.057)
Defense Skill Rating -0.017 -0.005 -0.047 -0.042
(0.024) (0.040) (0.050) (0.050)
Jury-Rated Complexity - - -0.092+
(0.051)
Defendant Female -0.142 -0.137 -0.199+ -0.227+
(0.113) (0.121) (0.114) (0.117)
Defendant Hispanic -0.023 0.023 0.028 0.002
(0.123) (0.133) (0.140) (0.140)
Defendant Black -0.265* -0.225+ -0.214+ -0.231+
(0.109) (0.120) (0.129) (0.125)
Defendant Other Non-White 0.212 0.244 0.312* 0.280+
(0.160) (0.157) (0.139) (0.148)
Victim Female 0.278** 0.302** 0.354** 0.353**
(0.085) (0.087) (0.081) (0.083)
Victim Hispanic 0.115 0.181 0.204 0.251+
(0.130) (0.153) (0.144) (0.144)
Victim Black 0.331** 0.395** 0.435** 0.454**
(0.111) (0.124) (0.111) (0.111)
Victim Other Non-White 0.284 0.409** 0.333* 0.345*
(0.196) (0.137) (0.165) (0.160)
Homicide -0.105 -0.073 -0.113 -0.073
(0.106) (0.104) (0.106) (0.111)
Rape 0.360** 0.406** 0.380** 0.399**
(0.103) (0.099) (0.092) (0.085)
Robbery/Theft/Larceny 0.015 -0.041 0.014 0.015
(0.090) (0.091) (0.093) (0.094)
Drug Related 0.192* 0.194* 0.195* 0.203*
(0.085) (0.090) (0.090) (0.089)
Court-Appointed Attorney 0.060 0.046 0.033 0.022
(0.083) (0.088) (0.090) (0.091)
# of Pros. Witnesses -0.009 -0.001 -0.017 -0.015
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
# of Pros. Experts -0.042 -0.033 -0.068* -0.058+
(0.027) (0.028) (0.032) (0.032)
# of Pros. Exhibits 0.014** 0.012** 0.017** 0.017**
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
# of Def. Witnesses -0.038* -0.033* -0.056** -0.057**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
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# of Def. Experts 0.208* 0.256** 0.328** 0.337**
(0.083) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086)
# of Def. Exhibits 0.005 0.005 0.005+ 0.005+
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 317 297 315 315
Pseudo R-Squared 0.19 0.22 0.28 0.29
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Notes: Evaluation of Hung Juries in Bronx County, New York, Los Angeles County, California,
Maricopa County, Arizona, and Washington, DC, 2000-2001 data come from the Inter-
University Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dependent variable is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if defendant was convicted. Specification 1 uses measures of attorney skill
as rated by the judge. In specification 2, the skill measures come from the opposing attorney-
the defense rates the prosecution, and the prosecution rates the defense. Specifications 3 and
4 both use the average of the jurors' attorney skill ratings, and specification 4 adds the jurors'
average case complexity rating to control for any effects of juror confusion on attorney skill
ratings. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Dummy variables for
missing values of victim race and victim gender included in regression but not reported.
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APPENDIX TABLE IV. FULL LINEAR PROBABILITY MODEL OF
SENTENCING
Judge Skill Ratings Opposing Jury Skill Ratings
Attorney Skill
Ratings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prosecution Skill Rating -0.053 0.155 -0.213 -0.293
(0.094) (0.136) (0.295) (0.295)
Defense Skill Rating 0.106 0.197 -0.295 -0.346
(0.085) (0.143) (0.243) (0.244)
Jury-Rated Complexity - - - 0.292
(0.191)
Defendant Female -0.275 -0.255 -0.268 -0.184
(0.384) (0.389) (0.409) (0.437)
Defendant Hispanic -0.128 -0.037 -0.129 -0.239
(0.534) (0.565) (0.540) (0.553)
Defendant Black 0.486 0.494 0.474 0.403
(0.477) (0.526) (0.476) (0.481)
Defendant Other Non-White 0.315 0.366 0.205 0.307
(1.376) (1.267) (1.234) (1.179)
Victim Female 0.688+ 0.685+ 0.553 0.573
(0.367) (0.377) (0.410) (0.400)
Victim Hispanic 0.887+ 0.793 1.160* 0.915
(0.490) (0.632) (0.535) (0.584)
Victim Black 0.406 0.506 0.496 0.454
(0.524) (0.614) (0.525) (0.525)
Victim Other Non-White 1.510** 0.978 1.266+ 1.207+
(0.544) (0.712) (0.640) (0.632)
Homicide 2.521** 2.285** 2.829** 2.650**
(0.337) (0.383) (0.315) (0.357)
Rape 1.590** 1.420* 1.559** 1.529*
(0.582) (0.587) (0.595) (0.586)
Robbery/Theft/Larceny 1.803** 1.596** 1.760** 1.887**
(0.329) (0.354) (0.308) (0.331)
Drug Related 0.604 0.397 0.618 0.663+
(0.392) (0.417) (0.398) (0.386)
Court-Appointed Attorney -0.436 -0.422 -0.369 -0.246
(0.311) (0.325) (0.327) (0.338)
# of Pros. Witnesses 0.086** 0.084* 0.063+ 0.054
(0.030) (0.034) (0.033) (0.035)
# of Pros. Experts -0.190* -0.212* -0.147 -0.177+
(0.086) (0.093) (0.096) (0.097)
# of Pros. Exhibits -0.004 -0.005 -0.001 -0.001
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
# of Def. Witnesses 0.018 0.003 0.054 0.069
(0.059) (0.062) (0.065) (0.067)
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# of Def. Experts -0.152 -0.019 -0.136 -0.037
(0.355) (0.373) (0.366) (0.368)
# of Def. Exhibits -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 -0.010
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Constant 1.327 0.140 3.717+ 3.379
(0.859) (0.971) (2.191) (2.212)
Observations 141 132 141 141
Adjusted R-squared 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.42
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Notes: Evaluation of Hung Juries in Bronx County, New York, Los Angeles County, California,
41aricopa County, Arizona, and Washington, DC, 2000-2001 data come from the Inter-University
Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dependent variable is a discrete sentencing
variable ranging from I to 7, with 1 representing less than 1 year in prison, and 7 representing
life in prison. Specification 1 uses measures of attorney skill as rated by the judge. In
specification 2, the skill measures come from the opposing attorney-the defense rates the
prosecution, and the prosecution rates the defense. Specifications 3 and 4 both use the average of
the jurors' attorney skill ratings, and specification 4 adds the jurors' average case complexity
rating to control for any effects of juror confusion on attorney skill ratings. Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors in parentheses. Dummy variables for missing values of victim race and
victim gender included in regression but not reported.
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APPENDIX TABLE V. FULL ORDERED PROBIT MODEL OF SENTENCING
Judge Skill Opposing Jury Skill Ratings
Ratings Attorney Skill
Ratings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prosecution Skill Rating -0.035 0.152 -0.196 -0.276
(0.084) (0.123) (0.266) (0.265)
Defense Skill Rating 0.093 0.205 -0.292 -0.359
(0.084) (0.126) (0.219) (0.223)
Jury-Rated Complexity - - - 0.306+
(0.167)
Defendant Female -0.237 -0.227 -0.248 -0.178
(0.352) (0.340) (0.369) (0.396)
Defendant Hispanic 0.121 0.205 0.156 0.027
(0.459) (0.493) (0.457) (0.483)
Defendant Black 0.667 0.700 0.680 0.589
(0.433) (0.480) (0.432) (0.446)
Defendant Other Non-White 0.294 0.310 0.200 0.310
(1.210) (1.100) (1.076) (1.041)
Victim Female 0.664+ 0.636+ 0.516 0.574
(0.348) (0.353) (0.367) (0.362)
Victim Hispanic 0.688 0.517 0.928+ 0.703
(0.442) (0.574) (0.477) (0.508)
Victim Black 0.277 0.285 0.371 0.355
(0.460) (0.558) (0.458) (0.463)
Victim Other Non-White 1.308* 0.643 1.002+ 0.961+
(0.541) (0.653) (0.578) (0.571)
Homicide 2.359** 2.085** 2.665** 2.533**
(0.414) (0.442) (0.417) (0.434)
Rape 1.225* 1.031* 1.196* 1.185*
(0.487) (0.476) (0.486) (0.490)
Robbery/Theft[Larceny 1.613** 1.431** 1.560** 1.741**
(0.330) (0.329) (0.287) (0.322)
Drug Related 0.504 0.315 0.522 0.583+
(0.356) (0.367) (0.360) (0.350)
Court-Appointed Attorney -0.278 -0.244 -0.228 -0.095
(0.291) (0.305) (0.298) (0.311)
# of Pros. Witnesses 0.082** 0.081** 0.061* 0.050
(0.027) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031)
# of Pros. Experts -0.175* -0.201* -0.141 -0.169+
(0.083) (0.089) (0.090) (0.092)
# of Pros. Exhibits -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.000
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
# of Def. Witnesses 0.013 0.003 0.047 0.055
(0.055) (0.058) (0.060) (0.059)
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# of Def. Experts -0.009 0.132 0.030 0.127
(0.293) (0.302) (0.303) (0.313)
# of Def. Exhibits -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 -0.010+
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 141 132 141 141
Pseudo R-Squared 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.21
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Notes: Evaluation of Hung Juries in Bronx County, New York, Los Angeles County, California,
Maricopa County, Arizona, and Washington, DC, 2000-2001 data come from the Inter-University
Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dependent variable is a discrete sentencing
variable ranging from 1 to 7, with 1 representing less than 1 year in prison, and 7 representing
life in prison. Specification 1 uses measures of attorney skill as rated by the judge. In
specification 2, the skill measures come from the opposing attorney-the defense rates the
prosecution, and the prosecution rates the defense. Specifications 3 and 4 both use the average
of the jurors' attorney skill ratings, and specification 4 adds the jurors' average case complexity
rating to control for any effects of juror confusion on attorney skill ratings. Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors in parentheses. Dummy variables for missing values of victim race and
victim gender included in regression but not reported.
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